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Abstract	 ﾠ
Aiming	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠfacilities	 ﾠand	 ﾠimprove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠattainment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
poor	 ﾠrural	 ﾠstudents,	 ﾠChina’s	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠmerging	 ﾠremote	 ﾠrural	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠschools	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠcentralized	 ﾠvillage,	 ﾠtown,	 ﾠor	 ﾠcounty	 ﾠschools	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlate	 ﾠ1990s.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠaccompany	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
policy,	 ﾠboarding	 ﾠfacilities	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠconstructed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠallow	 ﾠ(mandate)	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠ
school-ﾭ‐aged	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠto	 ﾠlive	 ﾠat	 ﾠschool	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠat	 ﾠhome.	 ﾠMore	 ﾠgenerally,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠimprove	 ﾠrural	 ﾠschools,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠthose	 ﾠin	 ﾠcounties	 ﾠand	 ﾠtowns.	 ﾠ
Unfortunately,	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠwork	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠto	 ﾠevaluate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnew	 ﾠ
merger	 ﾠand	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠprograms	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠof	 ﾠstudents.	 ﾠDrawing	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠa	 ﾠunique	 ﾠdataset	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrecords	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpath	 ﾠby	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠnavigate	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠ
school	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ(i.e.,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠschools	 ﾠdid	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠattend)	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠmath	 ﾠ
test	 ﾠscores	 ﾠin	 ﾠthree	 ﾠpoverty-ﾭ‐stricken	 ﾠcounties,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠdescriptive	 ﾠstatistics	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
multivariate	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠ(both	 ﾠOLS	 ﾠand	 ﾠcovariate	 ﾠmatching)	 ﾠto	 ﾠanalyze	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠpaths	 ﾠand	 ﾠstudent	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠperformance.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠallows	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
examine	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠand	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠschool	 ﾠmerger	 ﾠand	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠprograms.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
results	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠwho	 ﾠattend	 ﾠcounty	 ﾠschools	 ﾠperform	 ﾠ
systematically	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthose	 ﾠattend	 ﾠvillage	 ﾠor	 ﾠtown	 ﾠschools.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠcompleting	 ﾠ
primary	 ﾠschool	 ﾠin	 ﾠtown	 ﾠschools	 ﾠseems	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠstudents’	 ﾠacademic	 ﾠ
performance.	 ﾠSurprisingly,	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠteaching	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhurt	 ﾠ
rural	 ﾠstudents;	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontrary,	 ﾠit	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtest	 ﾠscores	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcases.	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
terms	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠboarding	 ﾠeffect,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneutral	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠin	 ﾠOLS	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
covariate	 ﾠmatching	 ﾠresults	 ﾠconfirm	 ﾠthat	 ﾠboarding	 ﾠat	 ﾠschool	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstudents;	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠcases	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠeven	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠacademic	 ﾠperformance.	 ﾠ
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Do Poor Students Benefit from China’s Merger Program? 
Transfer Path and Educational Performance 
	 ﾠ
1. Introduction	 ﾠ
Aiming to improve the quality of rural education and reduce educational 
disparities between urban and rural areas, China’s State Council implemented the Rural 
Primary School Merger Program in the late 1990s. Especially during early and mid 2000s, 
many one-room schoolhouses offering schooling from grades 1 through 4—so called 
teaching points (jiaoxuedian)—were shut down and merged into centralized schools in 
larger villages and towns. Resources were channeled towards larger schools in selected 
towns and the county seat, and the role of smaller village schools was downgraded. 
Indeed, the number of primary schools in rural China fell by 50% between 1999 and 2009 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2000, 2010). 
Given the broad scope of the Merger Program (and future plans to continue the 
Program), a significant question is whether the initiative has had any net benefit for poor 
children in rural areas. In teaching points a single teacher is responsible for teaching every 
student in every grade from grade 1 to grade 4. The teacher typically teaches all 
students—in grades 1 to 4—in a single classroom. With insufficient resources, teachers in 	 ﾠ
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teaching points often only teach math and Chinese and little in the way of other courses 
(such as, art, science or music). In contrast, centralized town or county schools have 
specialized teachers, better facilities and more curricular offerings (Zhuo, 2006). If access 
to these better facilities, teachers and curriculum positively affects the educational 
performance of children, we can say that there is a positive resource effect.   
On the other hand, there are aspects of school mergers that may have a number of 
adverse effects on students. First, transferring may reduce the student’s level of comfort 
and familiarity (associated with going to school in one’s own village—as it typically in a 
teaching point or a village primary school), thus negatively affecting educational 
performance. Second, students who transfer to a new school usually live far away and 
must board at the school. Third, the lack of parental care (because children live away from 
home) might also lead to psychological problems, especially for young students from 
grade 1 to grade 3 (Pang, 2006; Luo et al., 2009). Fourth, students who board at 
centralized schools have been shown to have poorer nutrition and health relative to the 
students that live at home (Luo et al., 2009; Luo et al., 2010). In turn, poor nutrition and 
psychological problems almost certainly detract from student learning. We call these 
adverse effects the disruption effect. 
Finding the net benefit of the Merger Program requires an analysis of both its 
benefits (the resource effects) and costs (the disruption effects). To date, we know of only 
one research team that has published an empirical paper disaggregating costs and benefits 
to determine the net effect of the Merger Program on students. Using data from a large 
sample in Shaanxi province in the early 2000s, Liu et al. (2010) found that the overall 	 ﾠ
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effect of transferring students from a village school or teaching point closed under the 
Merger Program to a larger, more central school is neutral; that is, the positive benefits 
from the improved resource effect were similar in magnitude to the negative costs.   
However, specific policies to merge schools differ across provinces, prefectures, 
and even within counties (Liu et al. 2010). Henan Province merged all village schools into 
one for each village if the village has a population above a certain threshold. Yunnan 
Province shut down teaching points with only one teacher and merged them into village 
schools. Qinghai Province established town and county boarding schools to receive 
students from nearby villages and teaching points. These are but three province level 
policies; counties and prefectures also adjusted these policies in practice (Liu et al. 2010). 
In addition, in our interviews in China’s poor northwest region in 2009 and 2010, we 
often have found that two or more of these different policies and resulting transfer paths 
can exist in a single county. As such, the Merger Program does not only shift students 
from teaching points to county schools. In fact, primary school students transfer from 
school to school in a variety of permutations: teaching point to village school; teaching 
point to town school; village school to another village school; village school to town 
school; village or town school to the county seat school; and more. In the rest of the paper 
we term the different paths taken by different students through primary school transfer 
paths. 
In summary, specific transfer paths can and often differ by student. Moreover, 
because each transfer path has its own unique set of benefits (resource effects vary across 
types of schools) and costs (disruption effects also can vary across types of schools), it is 	 ﾠ
3 
possible that different transfer paths will have different impacts on the educational 
performance of students. This fact further complicates the debate about merger costs and 
benefits and must be addressed to develop a comprehensive argument. 
To our knowledge, no published empirical study in development economics exists 
that evaluates the costs and benefits of the Merger Program while accounting for different 
transfer paths of students. In the Liu et al. paper 	2010
, the authors compare students 
who transfer to schools (guest students) with students who were originally at the school 
(host students) to examine the effect of mergers. However, they only measure the effect of 
switching schools due to mergers and do not account for the different kinds of schools 
that students can transfer out from or transfer into. Certainly a rigorous analysis of the 
costs and benefits associated with the program could suggest potential adjustments to 
policymakers. Given the scope of the mergers today (and plans for continue in the future), 
such a study is overdue.   
The overall goal of this paper is to evaluate the effect of different transfer paths on 
student educational performance. At the broadest level we ask, what are the net benefits 
related to the different transfer paths for poor, rural students? The key questions we 
attempt to address in our study include: a.)What transfer paths are students taking as a 
result of the Merger Program and other educational policy shifts? b.) How are student test 
scores affected by transfer paths? c.) Are there any negative impacts of the Merger 
Program? d.) Is educational performance affected by whether or not students live at home 
or board at school?   	 ﾠ
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In order to answer these questions, we draw on a dataset we collected in three 
poverty-stricken counties in China. We begin by categorizing types of transfer paths 
among students in the sample counties. We then compare standardized math test scores 
among students that have taken different transfer paths. We also use different estimation 
strategies—OLS estimation and covariate matching—to examine the impact of transfer 
paths and boarding statuses of the students on their educational performance. These 
estimation strategies attempt to control for the fact that both educational performance and 
transfer paths may be affected by the characteristics of students and their families. Finally, 
based on the empirical results, we discuss the net potential benefits of the Merger 




Our data come from a survey we fielded in three counties (Ningshan, Shiquan and 
Hanyin) in the south part of Shaanxi Province, one of the nation’s poorest provinces. 
These counties are well-suited to answering our research question. First, these counties 
were either nationally- or provincially-designated poor counties.
i  They thus broadly 
represent the rural poor in China. Second, county officials launched the Merger Program 
in these counties at the end of the 1990s, and sufficient time has passed for the policy to 
take effect. Third, the transfer paths of the students in these sample counties are diverse, 
such that there is sufficient variation to study the relationship of transfer paths and 
educational performance.   	 ﾠ
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Our sample was drawn from 36 junior high schools in the three study counties. In 
Ningshan County, all the seventh and eighth grade classes in all of the junior high schools 
were selected. In Shiquan County and Hanyin County, a subset of seventh grade and 
eighth grade classes in every junior high school were randomly selected. Because of the 
size of Shiquan and Hanyin, it would have been impossible, given our budget, to survey 
all classes in each school in these two counties. 
    In every sample class, we surveyed all the students. The total sample of 5700 
students consists of 2798 seventh graders in 2009. The total sample also included 2902 
eighth graders.  	 ﾠ
The sample of students appears to be similar in nature to what would be expected 
in a rural, poor setting. For example, we find 6% more boys than girls, a ratio similar to 
that cited in the Ministry of Education’s 2010 Annual Yearbook: 7% more boys than girls. 
Approximately 98% of the seventh graders are aged between 11 and 15 years and about 
99% of the eighth graders are aged between 12 and 16 years.  	 ﾠ
Our measure of educational performance, the key dependent variable in the study, 
was based on a 30-minute standardized math test that we administered ourselves. Since 
the test was administered at the beginning of the school year, the test is measuring the 
accumulated math ability from each student’s elementary schooling for seventh graders 
and for eighth graders it is, in part, measuring measure the accumulated math ability from 
students’ elementary schooling (but, only in part, since they had already studied in junior 
high for one year). This math test was scored on a scale from 0 to 100. The results that we 
obtain closely approximate a normal distribution with a mean score of 54 points and a 	 ﾠ
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standard deviation of 17 points for seventh graders and a normal distribution of mean 
score of 57 points and a standard deviation of 19 points for eighth graders. We keep the 
scores without any further manipulation (that is, we do not normalize them as is done in 
some educational studies) for the ease of interpretation. 
To measure our main independent variable, the transfer path of each student, we 
collected detailed information on the schooling histories of each student. We asked 
students when and where they attended each grade during their primary school years in 
order to create a variable to characterize each student’s transfer path from grade 1 to grade 
6. In addition, we also asked questions about school type and boarding status (either 
living at home or living at school) in each grade. Based on the answers to these questions, 
we created variables for student transfer path, boarding status and each student’s primary 
school educational experience. 
In addition to educational performance and transfer path status, we also collected 
information on each student's personal and family characteristics to use as controls. 
Variables included each student’s age, gender, household registration status (either urban 
or rural, also called hukou), and ethnicity; each family member’s age, educational 
attainment, and employment status; the household’s land holdings; and the total number 
of household members. The answers to detailed questions about household assets were 
used to generate a variable measuring the value of the household durable assets to 
represent household socioeconomic status or wealth. All of the controls in the study’s 
empirical model are produced from the above information.	 ﾠ
 
Transfer paths and educational performance 	 ﾠ
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In part because of the closing and/or merging of a large number of rural schools, 
2062 of the 5700 students in our sample (nearly 36 percent of our sample) transferred 
from one school to another at some point during their primary school years. Our data 
contain many unique starting and ending points for the transfer experiences of students, 
which we use to identify a variety of student transfer paths. In this section, we provide a 
general picture of these transfer paths, and describe the relationship between these paths 
and educational performance.	 ﾠ
Student transfer paths 
Our data confirm that there are indeed different transfer paths among the 36 
percent of students in our sample that started school in one type of school and finished in 
another (Table 1). Generally speaking, more students transfer to town and county schools 
than transfer from them (row 3; row 4). Likewise, more students transfer from teaching 
points and village schools than transfer to them (row 1; row 2). To be specific, only 28% 
of all students started primary education in town schools, but 45 percent of students 
finished primary education in town schools. At the same time, the percentage (41%) of 
the students who finished primary education in village schools is less than the percentage 
(44%) of the students who finished primary education in village schools. Furthermore, the 
percentage (14%) of students who finished in county schools is a little more than the 
percentage (10%) of students who started primary education in county schools. These 
patterns suggest that, in our sample, students are being encouraged to transfer from 
teaching points or village schools to more centralized town and county schools. Moreover, 
town schools are the main destination schools for rural students.   	 ﾠ
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There are some types of schools that play specific roles in different transfer paths. 
Among the students that started primary education in teaching points (18% of all students), 
none of them transferred to a teaching point (row 1). The fact that no student finished 
primary education in a teaching point reflects the fact that teaching points, by definition, 
do not provide education beyond the fourth grade. Moreover, no student transferred from 
one teaching point in his/her village to a teaching point in another village. Again, this 
finding reflects the fact that teaching points are designed to allow younger students to go 
to school in his/her own village under the tutelage of a teacher that can get to know the 
students.   
Our data also show that transfer paths differ substantially even among students 
who start primary education in the same type of school (Table 2). For example, around 63 
percent (655/(316+655+68)) of students that started in teaching points eventually 
transferred to town schools. Another 30 percent (316/(316+655+68)) transferred to village 
schools. The remaining 7 percent (68/(316+655+68)) of students that started in teaching 
points transferred to county schools. As such, our data shows that students from teaching 
points were transferring to more centralized but different kinds of schools. 
The same is true for students who started their primary school years in village 
schools (Table 2). Of the 761 students (417+98+246) that started in village schools, 55% 
(417 of them) transferred to town schools (column 1, rows 4 to 6) and 13% (98 of them) 
transferred to county schools. The remaining 32% (246 of them) transferred to another 
village school. This movement further reveals that, in our sample, more students 
transferred to town schools than village/county schools under the Merger Program. 	 ﾠ
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Taken together, the data show that few students transferred from town schools to 
village schools (or other combination of “reverse flows”). Only 48 students transferred 
from a town school to a village school (Table 2, row 7). Even fewer (26=11+15) 
transferred from a county school to either a town or village school (rows 10 and 11).   
Finally, a subset of students transferred between schools, but stayed in the same 
administrative level. For example, there were some students (82) that transferred between 
town schools (from town to town—row 8). There were 20 students in our sample that 
transferred between county schools (county to county—row 12).   
Educational performance across transfer paths 
We now turn to consider how various student transfer paths are correlated with the 
mean math scores, which are used as proxies for educational performance (Table 2). This 
analysis helps us identify and isolate several of the effects associated with different 
transfer paths.   
First, it appears that the higher level the school (village versus town versus 
county), the higher the test scores. According to our data, among students who did not 
switch schools, students in county schools score higher than students in town or village 
schools To be specific, the test scores of students that spent all six years of primary school 
in the same county school (66.0—row 15) are greater than students that stayed in the 
same town school (52.1—row 14). The scores of students that stayed in the same town 
school for all six years, in turn, are higher than students that spent all six years in the same 
village school (51.7—row 13). Likewise, when comparing students that transferred from 
one school to another within the same level of schooling (that is: county to county; town 	 ﾠ
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to town; or village to village—rows 4, 8 and 12), scores are higher in the case of county 
schools (72.3) relative to those in town (55.4) and village schools (51.0). From these 
numbers it would appear that the Merger Program, to the extent that schooling is being 
concentrated in towns and counties, is benefitting rural students.   
The propensity to score higher on the standardized test of the schools in the county 
seat can also be seen in our data. The scores of students who either spent all six years in 
county schools (transferring from county to county or staying in the same county 
school—rows 12 and 15) or finished their primary school years in a county school 
(teaching point-county; village-county; town county—rows 3, 6 and 9) all exceed 63 
points. When students did not attend a county school (with the rare exception of the few 
students that started in county schools and finished in either a village or town 
school—rows 10 and 11), the scores are all 59 points or less. The mean scores of students 
that attended county schools (rows 3, 6, 9, 12 and 15) are 66.2 points; the mean scores of 
students that did not attend county schools (rows 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 13, 14) are 53.3 points. 
Taken together, this evidence suggests that county schools foster the best academic 
performance among all types of schools. 
Furthermore, using the same data, but examining different combinations of 
transfer paths, the disruption effect of switching schools (that is, holding the level of 
schooling constant) is not particularly evident. Specifically, when we compare the scores 
of students that transferred from one county school to another county school, their scores 
are higher (72.3—row 12) than students that stayed in county schools for all six years of 
primary school (66.0—row 15). The town-town transferees also scored higher (55.4—row 	 ﾠ
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8) than students that stayed in one town school for all six years (53.1—row 14). The 
scores of village-village transferees are almost identical to scores of students who stay in 
the same village school (51.7 versus 51.0—rows 4 and 13). From this descriptive analysis 
there is even more support for the efficacy of the Merger Program; there are no empirical 
grounds in our sample that suggests the disruption effect is serious.
ii 
However, somewhat surprisingly, the descriptive data in Table 2 may point to a 
weakness in the Merger Program. One of the main targets of the Merger Program is to 
shut down teaching points, but students may benefit when they start their primary 
schooling in teaching points versus other types of schools. In the case of transfers from 
teaching points to village schools (row 1), the scores of the students (56.2) are higher than 
when students are either in the village to village (51.0) or village only (51.7) transfer 
paths (rows 4 and 13). In the case of transfers from teaching points to town schools (row 
2), the scores of the students (58.7) also are higher than when students are in the town to 
town (55.4) or town only (52.1) transfer paths (rows 8 and 14). One interpretation of these 
comparisons is that, in fact, there may be some benefit to having young children (less than 
fourth grade) stay in their own village to go to school, rather than attending a school 
outside of the familiar environment of one’s own home community. It could also be that 
the attention/care paid to students in a teaching point up to grade 4 is able to offset lower 
quality in teaching ability and/or less broad course offerings. Our study, of course, can 
never tell us why. However, this evidence raises the hypothesis that teaching points have 
strengths, and those strengths might need to be preserved in teaching points or replicated 
in larger, centralized schools.   	 ﾠ
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Boarding or living at home 
One of the key components of China’s Merger Program is to allow students to 
board at school as a way to enjoy the positive benefits of greater resources in centralized 
schools. However, it is possible that living and taking meals away from home is one of 
the large parts of the cost associated with the disruption effect. Luo et al. (2009) have 
documented the deficient nature of boarding facilities. Luo et al. (2010) shows that 
students in boarding facilities are less well nourished and have lower scores on 
standardized tests. Because of this fact, it is important to try to isolate the boarding effect, 
given equal levels of the resource effect.   
We can begin isolating the boarding effect by comparing the scores of boarding 
and non-boarding students that went through the same transfer path. When looking at the 
data in this way, we can see that 10 of the 15 different transfer paths can be used to make 
comparisons. Observations on five of the transfer paths (teaching point-county; 
village-county; town-county; county-county; and in the same county-only) could not be 
used since none of these students in the transfer path live at school (because in our three 
sample counties, there were no boarding facilities in the county seat schools). Among the 
other 10 transfer paths (those that involved schools in villages and towns and not schools 
in the county seat), some students boarded whereas others lived at home. 
Using this subset of data, descriptive statistics provide a mixed picture of the 
relationship between boarding
iii  and test scores (Table 3). There are six transfer paths 
(teaching point-village school; teaching point-town school; village-village school; 
village-town school; county to village school; and in the same town school only) in which 	 ﾠ
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the scores of boarding school students are higher than the non-boarding school students 
(rows 1, 2, 4, 5, 10 and 14). In the other four transfer paths (town-village school; 
town-town school; county-town school; in the same village school-only) the scores of the 
non-boarding students are higher than the boarding students (rows 7, 8, 11 and 13). Since 
there are more observations in the subset of six transfer paths in which the boarding 
school students outperform the non-boarding school students, one might be inclined to 
suggest that there is no detrimental effect to living at school.   
When looking at the entire sample, however, a different story emerges (Table 3, 
row 16). Out of the total number of students in our dataset (5546), 34 percent of them (or 
1871 students) boarded at school in the year that they were finishing their primary school 
(that is, typically during grade 6). The other 66 percent (or 3675 students) lived at home 
during their sixth year in primary school. When comparing these two groups, the scores of 
the non-boarders (56.0) are greater than the scores of the boarders (54.2). Hence, given 
the mixed nature of the results using descriptive statistics, it is important to examine the 
results from a multivariate analysis.     
Other effects and descriptive analysis summary   
The educational performance of the students might also be affected by other 
characteristics in addition to the transfer paths and boarding status. According to the 
literature (Liu et al 2010, Chen et al, 2009, Linnemayr et al, 2008, Shariff, 1998, etc.) 
individual student characteristics, such as gender, age, hukou identity, pre-school 
experience and number of siblings may also affect educational performance. Parental 
characteristics, like age, education and occupation; and household characteristics like 	 ﾠ
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household size and wealth also have been shown to affect educational performance. These 
findings underline the importance of conducting multivariate analysis and including 
parental and household characteristics in the analysis as control variables, since they may 
also be correlated with student transfer paths. 
In summary, then, most of the descriptive analysis appears to support the need to 
put more resources into schools, as has been done into the town and county schools. In 
most cases, students that have gone to schools in the higher levels of schooling have 
higher scores. Furthermore, transferring per se also does not have any obvious, large 
disruption effects. Hence, the resource effect seems to dominate. The one (potentially 
important) exception is that the quality of schooling in teaching points in our sample 
counties may not be so bad that teaching points should be shut down at any cost. In fact, 
students that attended teaching points as part of their transfer paths often performed better 
in terms of test scores than many of their counterparts. Overall, boarding appears to 
reduce educational performance, but there are many transfer paths in which the boarding 
effect is positive. Such findings in the descriptive statistics provide a rich empirical basis 
for proceeding with the multivariate analysis in the rest of the paper.   
 
Econometric Estimation Strategy 
In this section we describe the estimation strategy for the econometric analysis 
(which will be used to further examine the impact of student transfer paths on academic 
performance). In the first subsection we present different estimators and specifications. In 	 ﾠ
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the second subsection we discuss how we intend to perform robustness and sensitivity 
checks. 
Basic estimator—Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
In order to estimate the impact of student transfer paths and boarding status on 
math test scores, we use OLS controlling (at least in part) for selection bias and 
endogeneity due to unobserved heterogeneity. We do so by including a set of observable 
covariates in the regression of key independent variables on math scores: 
                         (1) 
where the dependent variable Yi indicates the math score of student i; Pi is a vector of our 
variables of interest that includes fourteen student transfer path dummy variables. The 
variables are the transfer paths that include students transferring: a.) from a teaching point 
school to a village school; b.) from teaching point school to a town school; c.) from a 
teaching point school to a county school; d.) from a village school to another village 
school; e.) from a village school to a town school; f.) from a village school to a county 
school; g.) from a town school to a village school; h.) from a town school to another town 
school; i.) from a town school to a county school; j.) from a county school to a village 
school; k.) from a county school to a town school; l.) from a county school to another 
county school; m.) stay in the same town school and n.) stay in the same county school. 
The vector of parameters, , contains measures of the effects of the transfer path that we 
are interested in. The comparison group in this specification includes the students that 
studied in the same village school for all six years of primary school.   	 ﾠ
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In the rest of the equation, the symbol, Bi , the boarding status indicator variable, is 
also one of the other variables of interest. In equation (1), Bi is a dummy variable which 
equals 1 if the student boarded at the school where he/she finished primary education and 
0 if he/she did not board. Finally, the term, Xi is a vector of covariates included to capture 
the effect of the characteristics of the student, his/her parents, and household on the 
dependent variable (see discussion in the previous paragraph). 
Analyzed in this way, we will be able to test more rigorously some of the 
observations that were made in the descriptive analysis. Specifically, we can see, ceteris 
paribus, if math scores of students in county schools are systematically higher than the 
scores of students in town and village schools. The model can be used to assess the 
relative performance of students that transferred compared to those that did not transfer 
(all other things being equal). Additional tests can be carried out to measure the 
differences in scores of students that attended teaching points and those that did not. 
Finally, holding the nature of the transfer path constant, we will also be able to examine if 
living at school or home is associated with higher test scores.   
Alternative Estimation Approach-----Covariate matching   
In place of controlling for the covariates by adding additional regressors as we do 
in the OLS regression (described in the section immediately above), we can also use 
covariate matching as an alternative method to estimate the effect of transfer path on 
student educational performance. The main idea behind covariate matching is to select a 
treatment group and comparison or control group with identical observables, , and 
compare the outcomes of these two sets of groups (Rubin, 1974). Given a certain set of 	 ﾠ
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assumptions, covariate matching helps to correct the bias in estimation due to 
observables, because the source of the bias is the difference of observables in the treated 
group and comparison group. Matching on covariates by definition will remove this 
difference and hence the bias (Zhao, 2004).   
One of the main advantages of covariate matching over regression adjustment is 
that this method highlights areas of the covariate distribution where there is insufficient 
overlap between the treatment and control groups, such that the resulting treatment effect 
estimates would rely heavily on extrapolation (Stuart, 2010). Regression models have 
been shown to perform poorly when there is insufficient overlap, but their standard 
diagnostics do not involve checking this overlap (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999; Glazerman et 
al., 2003). Another advantage of covariate matching is that it does not require 
assumptions about linearity or constant treatment effects, and thus improves bias 
correction (Zhao, 2004). Studies have shown that methods such as linear regression 
adjustment can actually increase bias in the estimated treatment effect when the true 
relationship between the covariate and outcome is even moderately non-linear. Linear 
regression can increase bias especially when there are large differences in the means and 
variances of the covariates in the treated and control groups (Rubin, 1974; Heckman et al., 
1998). Thus, covariate matching is becoming a more general method than standard linear 
regression. In our setup, the treatments are defined to be the different student transfer 
paths and boarding statuses and we can use matching to examine the difference in test 
scores among students that are in different subsets of transfer paths.   	 ﾠ
18 
In sum, we are ultimately interested in estimating the average treatment effects 
on the treated (ATT)—measured in test score differences—of attending a county school 
(versus not attending county schools); of transferring to a new school (versus staying 
within the same school); of starting primary education in a teaching point school (versus 
not starting in a teaching point); and of living at school as a boarder (versus living at 
home).   
 
Econometric Results 
The estimation results of the basic estimator (OLS) using equation (1) are 
presented in Table 4. Columns (1) to (2) of Table 4 differ in the independent variables that 
are included in estimation: column (1) only includes the student transfer path variables 
(with no covariates); in column (2) we include the boarding status variable and all of the 
covariates. In addition, columns (3) and (4) are almost the same with column (2) except 
that a different comparison group of transfer path dummy variables are used in order to 
get the disruption effect of switching schools directly. That is, in column (2), the 
comparison group consists of students who studied in the same village school throughout 
primary school. The comparison group in model (3) consists of students that spent all six 
years in the same town school, and the comparison group in model (4) consists of students 
who stayed in the same county school for all six years. The model performs better as we 
move from column (1) to columns (2)/(3)/(4) as the R-square grows and covariates are 
shown to effectively capture more of the variation in math scores. Therefore, in the rest of 
our discussion we mostly focus on the results in columns (2)/(3)/(4). 
Based on Table 4, there are four main results. First, consistent with the descriptive 
analysis, the higher level the school the higher the test scores of students. Our results 	 ﾠ
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show that math scores of students in county schools are systematically higher than scores 
of students in town or village schools. Among students that never transferred to a new 
school throughout primary education, students who stay in the same county school 
perform better than students who stay in the same town or village schools. To be specific, 
everything else held constant, a student who stayed in the same county school scores 9.4 
(column 2, row 15) and 11.2 points (column 3, row 15) higher than his or her peers who 
spent all six years in the village or town school, respectively.   
Likewise, among students that transferred to a new school, students who 
transferred to county schools perform better than those who started in the same school and 
later transferred to village or town schools, regardless of whether students started primary 
education in village or town schools. Specifically, among students who started primary 
education in village schools, students who later transferred to county schools score 9.0 
points (8.5-(-0.5), column 2, row 6 and 4) and 7.8 points (8.5-0.8, column 2, row 6 and 5) 
higher than students who transferred to village or town schools.
iv  This is almost the same 
case for students who started primary education in village or town schools (rows 8 and 
9).
v  In short, students attending county schools perform better than students attending 
village or town schools. These findings may be interpreted as the positive resource effect 
in county schools: better teachers and higher quality facilities.
vi   
However, although town schools are the main destination schools to which 
students transferred under the Merger Program, our results show that attending town 
primary school seems to have no positive effect on students’ academic performance. 
Specifically, among students who spend all six years of primary education in a same 
school, students who study in town schools for all six years score 1.8 points lower than 
students studying in village schools (column 2, row 14). Among students that started 
primary education in village schools and later transferred to another school, students that 	 ﾠ
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finished in a town school score 1.3 points higher (0.8-(-0.5), column 2, row 4 and row 5) 
than those who finished in another village school. However, the joint test of the 
coefficients of village-village school transfer and village-town school transfer are not 
significantly different from zero. These findings suggest that students who transferred to 
town schools actually do not benefit from the Merger program in terms of the test score 
and are consistent with Liu et al. (2010).     
Second, our OLS results show that the disruption effect of switching schools on 
students’ educational performance is neutral. That is, according to our results, the 
coefficient of the dummy variable of transfers from village schools to another village 
school is negative but statistically insignificant (-0.533—column 2, row 4). Compared 
with students who studied in the same village school for all six years, students who 
transferred from village schools to other village schools score almost the same. When we 
further look at the pure impact of transferring to another town school, the coefficient of 
the town-town school transfer dummy variable is positive but also statistically 
insignificant (1.379—column 3, row 8). The result also holds when we compare the 
scores of students who transferred from a county school to another county school with the 
scores of students who stayed in the same county school throughout their primary 
education (column 4, row 12). In short, there is no evidence showing that there is a 
serious disruption effect of transferring to a new school on poor rural primary students in 
terms of math test scores. This result holds regardless of whether students transfer to 
another village, town or county school.   
Third, although teaching points have long been considered to have the least 
resources available, students who started primary education in teaching points perform 
better than those who started primary education in village or town schools. That is, among 
students that transfer to village schools, students who start primary education in teaching 	 ﾠ
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points score 2.8 points higher than those who started primary education in village schools 
(2.3-(-0.5) —column 2, row 1 and 4).
vii  Likewise, other things being equal, compared to 
students on the town-town school transfer path, students who transfer from teaching 
points to town schools score 3.5 points higher (3.1-(-0.4) —column 2, row 2 and 8).
viii   
As such, students who transferred from teaching points seem to benefit from their 
experience. A number of reasons may explain this finding. First, students in the teaching 
points live close to home and are thus familiar with the surroundings, spend less time 
going to and back from the school, and receive more care from their family. Second, 
students in the teaching points are in a much smaller class than that in more centralized 
schools. On average, in Ningshan county, there are only 3 students per class in teaching 
points, but there are more than 12, 16 and 18 students in village, town, and county schools 
respectively (Ningshan Education Bureau, 2010). Small class sizes may mean that 
students in teaching points receive more care from the teachers. Especially because 
younger students may need more attention than older students, the benefits of starting in 
teaching points might offset and even outweigh the disadvantages of the lower quality of 
teachers in teaching points. Finally, the quality gap in our sample counties between 
teachers in teaching points and other schools have narrowed substantially since 2000. In 
2000, a number of teachers were fired after failing some teaching examinations (Wang, 
2008). Since most of the sample students started their primary education in teaching 
points in 2001 and 2002, they benefitted from this measure. In addition, before 2000, the 
teachers from the teaching points often attended special training courses. For example, 
during 1998 and 2000, every summer teachers from the teaching points received training 
on teaching method for about a week in Ningshan County (Ningshan Education Bureau, 
2010). Thus, in terms of teacher quality, the gap between teaching point schools and 
village or town schools may have narrowed in recent years. 	 ﾠ
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Fourth, our results reveal that the effect of boarding is neutral on student 
educational performance (table 4). Holding other factors constant, the effect of boarding 
at school is negative but statistically insignificant (row 16). Some reasons suggest why the 
neutral effect of boarding status might be true. Although the main disadvantage of 
boarding at school is poorer nutrition and health in boarding schools (relative to the home 
environment) and less care from parents (Luo et al., 2009), parents are migrating from 
rural areas. As such, children who live at home may be receiving minimal care anyway. 
Thus, compared to students who live at home, the cost of boarding at school in terms of 
reduced parent care might not be high.   
In sum, our results from basic estimation show that although transfer per se does 
not have a serious effect on student educational performance, transferring to county 
schools systematically benefits rural students in terms of test scores. Second, transferring 
to town schools seems not to have any positive effects on student educational 
performance as the Merger Program expected. Third, studying in teaching points through 
grade 1 to 4 does seem to improve rural students’ educational performance. Fourth, there 
is no evidence in our analysis that boarding at school improves student educational 
performance. Finally, our covariates affect student educational performance as expected. 
Covariate Matching 
Importantly (since they show our results are robust), the results of covariate 
matching analysis are similar to the OLS results (Table 5). First, consistent with OLS 
results, the covariate matching results reveal the dominance of county schools. Compared 
to students who remain in their village or town schools throughout primary education, 
students who study in the same county school for all six years or transfer from village to 
county schools score 14.6 points and 7.6 points higher, respectively (Panel A, column 1 
and 2). Village school students that transfer to a county school score 11.8 points higher 	 ﾠ
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than village school students that transfer to another village school (Panel A, column 3). 
Likewise, town school students that transferred to a county school score 9.0 points higher 
than town school students that transferred to another town school (Panel A, column 4). As 
such, the resource effect in county schools is positive. 
However, as found in the OLS analysis, the resource effect in town schools is not 
evident. Students that spent all six years in town schools scored 1.7 points lower than 
students that spent all six years in village schools (Panel B, column 1). Although students 
transferring from village to town schools score 1.5 points higher than students taking 
village-village school transfer path, the coefficient is not statistically significant (Panel B, 
column 2). That is, students attending town schools do not appear to benefit from the 
resource effect compared to students attending village schools.     
Second, the result from covariate matching also reveals that the effect of 
transferring among schools of the same type is neutral. That is, compared to students that 
study in the same village, town, or county school throughout primary education, students 
who transfer to a new village, town, or county school at the same administrative level 
perform about the same (Panel C, columns 1, 2, and 3).   
Third, the covariate matching results reveals that starting primary education from 
a teaching point positively affects student educational performance, regardless when the 
student later transferred to a village or town school (Panel D, columns 1 and 2). In the 
case of students who transfer to a town school, students who start primary education in a 
teaching point score 5.6 points higher than students who start primary education in a town 
school. The coefficient is statistically significant (Panel D, column 2).     
Fourth and finally, our results show that boarding at school does not help student 
educational performance. Departing slightly from OLS findings, covariate matching 
results show that on average, students boarding at school score 2.1 points lower than 	 ﾠ
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students who lived at home. This result is statistically significant (Panel E, column 1). 
Among students staying in their village schools for six years, students boarding at school 
score much lower (3.3 points) than students living at home. This result is significant as 
well (Panel E, column 2). In addition, among students staying in town schools for six 
years, students boarding at school score 0.55 points lower than students living at home. 
However, this result is insignificant (Panel E, column 2). Taken together, these findings 
suggest that boarding does not help student improve their educational performance. In 
some cases boarding clearly reduces students’ academic performance. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper we have attempted to understand whether poor students in rural 
China have benefitted from the Merger Program by analyzing a set of transfer paths that 
students have taken during their primary education. Despite controversies about the 
benefits and costs of the Merger Program, our results show that students who attend 
county schools perform systematically better than those attend village or town schools. 
However, completing primary school in town schools seems to have no effect on 
students’ academic performance. Surprisingly, starting primary education in a teaching 
point does not hurt the rural students; on the contrary, it increases their test scores in some 
cases. Finally, in terms of the boarding effect, the neutral estimate in OLS and the 
negative estimate in covariate matching results confirm that boarding at school does not 
help the students; in some cases it may even reduce their academic performance. 
Although there may be good reasons (fiscally or pedagogically) for the changes 
(mergers/building up centralized county schools), our results imply that poor students are 
being systematically hurt by the rural China’s educational system reforms. First, we find 
that county schools foster the best academic performance among all the schools in rural 	 ﾠ
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areas. However, there are no boarding facilities in these county primary schools, so poor 
students have no real way of attending. If they want to attend, families must rent rooms; 
students’ guardians may have to quit their jobs and live with them. These arrangements 
are usually too costly for poor households, who thus opt to send their children to town or 
village schools. However, the effect of completing primary education in town or village 
schools is neutral. That is, students do not benefit from transferring to such schools. 
Furthermore, although rural poor students do well when starting in teaching points, these 
teaching points are being shut down. The students in the teaching points leave their 
familiar circumstances and most of them now study in village or town schools further 
away. Finally, for poor rural students, village and town schools are mostly far from home 
and they have to board at school. However, our results show that boarding does not help 
the poor rural students.   
In terms of policy, our paper has several implications. First, the results confirm 
that transferring to the county schools helps poor, rural students. However, these are 
largely unavailable to poor students. Policies that improve access to county schools (or 
schools with resources similar to county schools) might improve the education quality for 
poor rural students. Second, it seems that the positive resource effect that the government 
was hoping to achieve by the Merger Program does not apply to most rural students, who 
are transferring to village or town schools. If the government continues merging village 
schools (including teaching points) to town schools, it should invest more in town schools 
to increase the teaching quality (and facilities) in these schools. Third, village schools like 
teaching points may have redeeming qualities and should not be closed without further 
investigation of their benefits. Finally, boarding at school does not help poor rural 
students; if a way could be made to address the negative effects associated with 	 ﾠ
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boarding—poor nutrition, lack of familiarity, and less personal care—students might 
benefit from increased access to learning resources and facilities. 	 ﾠ
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Table 1. Distribution of sample students by the type of school in which they started 
primary school and by the type of school in which they finished primary school, in 
three study counties in Northwest China, 2009 
Starting school 
a    Ending school 
b 
No.  %    No.  %   
Type of school 
(1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
1  Teaching point schools  1,039  18       
2  Village schools  2,480  44    2,340  41 
3  Town schools  1,587  28    2,544  45 
4  County schools  594  10    816  14 
5  Total  5,700  100    5,700  100 
Data source: Authors’ survey   
Note: a. Starting school means the school where the students started primary school. 




Table 2    The math scores of sample students by the transfer path that the 
students took during their primary school years in three study counties in 
China, 2009.   
Obs. 
No.  %  Score  Transfer paths 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
1  Teaching point-village school  316  6  56.2 
2  Teaching point-town school  655  11  58.7 
3  Teaching point-county school  68  1  63.6 
4  Village-village school  246  4  51.0 
5  Village-town school  417  7  53.9 
6  Village-county school  98  2  66.8 
7  Town-village school  48  1  55.1 
8  Town-town school  86  2  55.4 
9  Town-county school  82  1  67.7 
10  County-village school  11  0.2  46.8 
11  County-town school  15  0.3  60.0 
12  County-county school  20  0.4  72.3 
13  In the same village school  1,719  30  51.7   
14  In the same town school  1,371  24  52.1   
15  In the same county school  548  10  66.0   
Total  5700  100  55.1 
Data source: Authors’ survey   	 ﾠ
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Table 3. The math scores of sample students that live at home and in boarding 
schools by the transfer path that the students took during their primary school years 
in three study counties in China, 2009. 
     T r a n s f e r   p a t h s  Boarding 
a  Non-boarding 
  No.  %  Score  No.  %  Score 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1.  Teaching point-village school  163  8.5  57.9  145  4.0  54.9 
2.  Teaching point-town school  471  24.6  59.8  169  4.6  56.5 
3.  Teaching point-county school  0      45  1.2  62.1 
4.  Village (home) –village (away) school  46  2.4  53.9  180  4.9  50.7 
5.  Village-town school  191  10.0  55.0  201  5.5  53.2 
6.  Village-county school  0      91  2.5  66.5 
7.  Town-village school  11  0.6  49.1  37  1.0  56.5 
8.  Town(home) –town (away) school  29  1.5  53.6  50  1.4  57.5 
9.  Town-county school  0      72  2.0  68.1 
10.  County-village school    2  0.1  50.0  9  0.2  46.1 
11.  County-town school  7  0.4  57.14  8  0.2  62.5 
12.  County (home)-county (away) school  0      16  0.4  75.0 
13  In the same village school  472  24.7    51.2    1,235  33.6    51.9   
14  In the same town school  479  25.0    52.7    885  24.1    51.8   
15  In the same county school  0      532  14.5    66.2   
16  Total  1,871  100  54.24  3,675  100  56.0 
Data source: Authors’ survey   
Note: a. The boarding dummy variable equals to 1 if the student boarded at the school where 
he/she finished primary education, otherwise it equals to 0. 	 ﾠ
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Table 4. Multivariate regression results analyzing the effect of transfer path on the 
educational performance of all the sample students in three study counties in China, 
2009
 a   
Dependent variable: standardized math score (0-100 points) 
Transfer path Dummy Variable
  (1)
b  (2)
 b  (3)
 c  (4)
 d 
4.591  2.325  4.078  -7.116  1. Transfer from teaching point to 
village school, 1= yes  (4.46)***  (2.26)**  (3.90)***  (4.91)*** 
7.063  3.061  4.814  -6.381  2. Transfer from teaching point to town 
school, 1= yes  (9.13)***  (3.58)***  (5.64)***  (4.89)*** 
11.948  5.836  7.588  -3.606  3. Transfer from teaching point to 
county school, 1= yes  (5.73)***  (2.77)***  (3.62)***  (1.60) 
-0.679  -0.533  1.219  -9.975  4. Transfer from village school to village 
school, 1= yes  (0.59)  (0.40)  (0.89)  (5.90)*** 
2.263  0.776  2.528  -8.666  5. Transfer from village school to town 
school, 1=yes  (2.46)**  (0.86)  (2.75)***  (6.48)*** 
15.182  8.451  10.203  -0.991  6. Transfer from village school to county 
school, 1= yes  (8.67)***  (4.19)***  (5.07)***  (0.46) 
3.032  -2.244  -0.492  -11.686  7. Transfer from town school to village 
school, 1= yes  (1.23)  (0.81)  (0.18)  (4.00)*** 
3.694  -0.374  1.379  -9.816  8. Transfer from town school to town 
school, 1= yes  (1.98)**  (0.24)  (0.90)  (5.59)*** 
16.028  12.731  14.484  3.290  9. Transfer from town school to county 
school, 1= yes  (8.41)***  (7.33)***  (8.39)***  (1.80)* 
-4.837  -10.979  -9.226  -20.420  10. Transfer from county school to 
village school, 1= yes  (0.95)  (2.50)**  (2.11)**  (4.64)*** 
8.345  -1.171  0.582  -10.612  11. Transfer from county school to town 
school, 1= yes  (1.91)*  (0.29)  (0.14)  (2.61)*** 
20.595  17.114  18.867  7.673  12. Transfer from county school to 
county school, 1= yes  (5.43)***  (3.62)***  (4.00)***  (1.62) 
13.Study in the same village school      1.753  -9.442 
      (2.72)***  (7.99)*** 
14.Study in the same town school  0.427  -1.753    -11.194 
  (0.70)  (2.72)***    (9.86)*** 
14.321  9.442  11.194    15.Study in the same county school 
(17.32)***  (7.99)***  (9.86)***   
Board Dummy Variable         
  -0.208  -0.208  -0.208  16.  Boarding  status,  1=boarded  in  the 
ending primary school    (0.36)  (0.36)  (0.36) 
Student characteristics         
17.Boy=1    1.624  1.624  1.624 
    (3.50)***  (3.50)***  (3.50)*** 
18. Age, year    -3.476  -3.476  -3.476 	 ﾠ
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    (13.47)***  (13.47)***  (13.47)*** 
19. Hukou identity, 1=rural    -0.286  -0.286  -0.286 
    (0.47)  (0.47)  (0.47) 
20. Kindergarten, 1=attended    -1.179  -1.179  -1.179 
    (1.40)  (1.40)  (1.40) 
21.Having no sibling, 1=yes    -0.326  -0.326  -0.326 
    (0.49)  (0.49)  (0.49) 
22.Grade dummy, 1 = grade 8    6.727  6.727  6.727 
    (13.26)***  (13.26)***  (13.26)*** 
Parental characteristics         
23. Age of father, year    -0.086  -0.086  -0.086 
    (1.15)  (1.15)  (1.15) 
24. Age of mother, year    0.056  0.056  0.056 
    (0.71)  (0.71)  (0.71) 
  1.310  1.310  1.310  25.  Father  holding  middle  school 
diploma or above, 1=yes    (2.37)**  (2.37)**  (2.37)** 
  0.758  0.758  0.758  26.  Mother  holding  middle  school 
diploma or above, 1=yes    (1.13)  (1.13)  (1.13) 
27. Father working in agriculture, 1=yes    -0.931  -0.931  -0.931 
    (1.77)*  (1.77)*  (1.77)* 
28.  Mother  working  in  agriculture, 
1=yes 
  0.870  0.870  0.870 
    (1.63)  (1.63)  (1.63) 
Household characteristics         
29. Household size    -0.418  -0.418  -0.418 
    (1.73)*  (1.73)*  (1.73)* 
30. Poor dummy, 1=yes    -0.619  -0.619  -0.619 
    (1.24)  (1.24)  (1.24) 
31.Shiquan County, 1=yes    6.306  6.306  6.306 
    (9.42)***  (9.42)***  (9.42)*** 
32.Hanyin County, 1=yes    -4.918  -4.918  -4.918 
    (7.58)***  (7.58)***  (7.58)*** 
Constant (not reported)         
Observations  5700  4850  4850  4850 
R-squared  0.08  0.20  0.20  0.20 
Data source: Authors’ survey   
Note: 
a. t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
b. The comparison group in model (1) and (2) is the students who studied in the same village school 
throughout the primary school. 
c. The comparison group in model (3) is the students who studied in the same town school throughout the 
primary school. 
d. The comparison group in model (4) is the students who studied in the same county school throughout the 
primary school. 	 ﾠ
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Table 5    Covariate Matching results analyzing the effect of transfer path and 
boarding status on student educational performance (Shaanxi Province, China 
2009)
ab   
Average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Panel A    The effect of attending the primary school in a county school   
Students in the same 
county school   
vs.   
Students in the same 
village school   
Students in the same 
county school   
vs.   
Students in the same 
town school 
Village-county school 
students   
vs.   
Village (home) –village 
(away) school students 
Town-county school 
students   




14.57  7.58  11.84  8.98 
(4.79) ***  (3.55) ***  (3.52) ***  (3.33) *** 
       
Panel B    The effect of attending the primary school in a town school
   
Students in the same 
town school   
vs. 
Students in the same 
village school 
Village-town school 





   
-1.69  1.51     
(2.16) **  (0.86)       
       
Panel C    The pure disruption effect of transfer   
Village (home) –village 
(away) school students 
vs. 






Students in the same 
town school 
County(home) –County 
(away) school students 
vs. 
Students in the same 
County school 
 
-0.65  0.65  6.65   
(0.43)  (0.31)  (1.36)   
       
Panel D  The effect of starting the primary education in a teaching point 
Teaching point-village 
school students   
vs. 





Students in the same 
town school 
   
1.42  5.64     	 ﾠ
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(0.68)  (2.10) **     
Panel E  The effect of boarding at school
   
Boarding students   
vs. 
Non-boarding students   
Boarding students 
who studied in the 
same village schools   
vs. 
Non-Boarding 
students who studied 
in the same village 
schools 
Boarding students who 
studied in the same town 
schools   
vs. 
Non-Boarding students 
who studied in the same 
town schools 
 
-2.13  -3.32  -0.55   
(3.17) ***  (2.97) ***  (0.43)   
Data source: Authors’ survey   
Note: 
a. z statistics are reported in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%, and nearest neighbor matching was used in matching. 
b. In each model, the treatment group is students before the term of “vs.” and the comparison group is 
students after “vs.” For example, in mode (1) in Panel A, the treatment group is students who studied 
in the same county school for all six years throughout their primary school and the comparison 
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i  In 1994, China’s government launched a poverty-reduction initiative under the "8-7 Plan" and 
designated 592 counties as national designated poor counties. Provinces followed with their own 
initiatives.     
ii  Of course, it is possible that there still is a negative disruption effect, but, that the gain is test scores 
is due to some sort of selection effect (that is, better students—that have higher test scores—were the 
ones that sought to move from poorer schools to better schools) and that this selection effect was high 
enough to more than offset any disruption effect. 
iii  In later analysis, the boarding dummy variable equals to 1 if the student boarded at the school where 
he/she finished primary education, and it equals to 0 if the student didn’t board at the school where 
he/she finished primary education. We also tried defining boarding status as the boarding dummy 
variable equals to 1 if the student ever boarded in primary school and it equals to 0 if he/she never 
boarded. The results are more or less the same. 
iv  The joint test of coefficients of village-village school transfer dummy and village-county school 
transfer dummy shows that the two coefficients are significantly different from each other at 1% level. 
And, the joint test of the coefficient of village-town school transfer dummy and the coefficient of 
village-county school transfer dummy shows that the two coefficients are significantly different from 
each other at 1% level. 
v  The joint test of coefficients of town-town school transfer dummy and town-county school transfer 
dummy shows that the two coefficients are significantly different from each other at 1% level. 
vi  It should be pointed out that the results do not fully hold for students who started primary education 
in teaching points. Although students transferring from teaching points to county schools score 3.5 
points (5.8-2.3—column 2, row 3 and 1) and 2.7 points (5.8-3.1—column 2, row 3 and 2) higher than 
students transferring from teaching points to village or town schools, the joint test of the coefficients 
shows that they are not significantly different from each other. Specifically, the joint test of 
coefficients of teaching point-village school transfer dummy variable and teaching point-county school 
transfer dummy variable shows that the two coefficients are not significantly different from each other. 
And the joint test of coefficients of teaching point-town school transfer dummy variable and teaching 
point-county school transfer dummy variable also shows that these two coefficients are not 
significantly different from each other. 
vii  The joint test of coefficients of teaching point-village school transfer dummy variable and 
village-village school transfer dummy variable shows that the two coefficients are significantly 
different from each other at 10% level. 
viii  The joint test of coefficients of teaching point-town school transfer dummy variable and 
town-town school transfer dummy variable shows that the two coefficients are significantly different 
from each other at 5% level. 